International
labour out-migration from Viet Nam
There are few, if any, cases
of immigrants into Viet Nam other than the Vietnamese returning
from overseas. Hence, it is more meaningful to discuss outward
migration from Viet Nam.
During the 1980s, there was
considerable out-migration of workers to the former Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Eastern European Bloc
countries: according to government records the peak number
of Vietnamese workers in these countries exceeded 200,000.
These workers did not belong to the poorer sections of the
society; however, being a low-income country, any out-migration
from Viet Nam would result in a multiplier effect through
the expenditure of remittances, which in turn would create
jobs and help to ease poverty. By the 1990s, when major
political changes swept Eastern Europe, most workers, except
those who returned to Germany, had returned to Viet Nam.
A new wave of migration to
Japan, numbering up to 15,000 each year, began in 1994,
and continued for awhile. Meanwhile the Republic of Korea
also attracted Vietnamese workers, estimated to be in the
range of about 22,000. These workers went in the capacity
of “trainees” and were therefore not protected
by locally prevalent laws relating to minimum wages. Workers
in the range of 20,000 to 30,000 have also been reported
to have found jobs in the Middle Eastern and East African
countries. These workers in general go alone, and they are
mainly male (over 80 per cent). Studies show that they face
discrimination, loneliness and linguistic barriers, and
hence alienation. They are also found to be engaged in hazardous
jobs (for example, in the fishing industry in the Republic
of Korea).
Yet another stream of migration
since the early 1980s has been in the direction of the Lao
People’s Democratic Republic and Cambodia (many more
to the latter), stemming from the fact that these countries
offered many more jobs and easy entry. The main activities
of Vietnamese migrants in the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic are in the construction business, in semi- and
low-skilled jobs. The number of Vietnamese migrants to Cambodia
is believed to be large, although no official data are available
to
obtain a reasonable estimate. Estimates can best be derived
from the Cambodian statistics presented in the next section.
Despite the fact that skilled
workers have gone out of Viet Nam, the majority of them
consist of relatively low-skill workers engaged in construction,
plumbing, garment manufacture, or in personal care activities.
The latest policy statements from authorities suggest that
the export of skilled labour will be high on the agenda
for years to come.
Vietnamese
migrants in Cambodia
As a part of its studies on
migration, CDRI conducted small sample interviews with Vietnamese
Associations and individual workers of Vietnamese origin
in selected villages of Kompong Chhnang and Phnom Penh in
order to determine the status of Vietnamese workers in Cambodia.
The Vietnamese, who had lived
in Cambodia for generations, were deported during the Lon
Nol regime (1970-1975) and later during the Khmer Rouge
regime (1975-1979). During the 1980s, they gradually returned
to Cambodia, along with friends, relatives and neighbours.
In the 1990s, a new wave of immigrants from Viet Nam was
attracted by the opportunities offered by a sudden opening
up of a market economy in Cambodia.
The scale of such immigration
is very difficult to estimate. Demographers calculate that,
if Cambodia’s population in 1985 (which is again an
estimated figure drawn from the internal records of the
Ministry of Economy and Finance) was 7.5 million, an average
natural growth rate of 2.4 per cent might be expected to
have brought the total population to around 9.9 million
by 1998. If 360,000 repatriated refugees and their offspring
are added to that, the total would add to around 10.3 million.
The actual total enumerated in the 1998 census was 11.4
million, implying a contribution of a little more than 1
million by immigrants and their subsequent offspring (mainly
composed of Vietnamese). Another estimate, provided by the
governments of eight provinces (Kandal, Battambang, Phnom
Penh, Takeo, Kompong Chhnang, Pursat, Prey Veng and Siem
Reap) representing 53 per cent of Cambodia’s population,
indicates that the total Vietnamese population was 227,000
in these provinces in 1995. The Kompong Chhnang Immigration
Office, interviewed in April 2000, estimated that there
had been a big increase in the number of Vietnamese in the
province since the 1980s – from 1,269 households containing
7,064 people in 1985 to 2,708 households with 13,445 people
in 1997 (So, 2001).
The occupation of Vietnamese
workers varies with their location. Those interviewed in
Kompong Chhnang were almost all involved in fishing year
round. These small- and medium-scale fishermen earned on
average around 10,000 riels (US$ 1 = 3,852 riels) per day,
in addition to earnings obtained from cage cultures. The
Vietnamese have been found to be especially dextrous in
fishing activities; this is the reason why they have been
successful in retaining their hold on this activity in Cambodia.
In Phnom Penh, most of those
interviewed worked as construction workers, traders and
skilled workers in machinery and electronic repair workshops,
wood processing enterprises etc. Around 80 per cent of the
small-scale contractors and supervisors in the construction
industry are believed to be of Vietnamese origin. Employers
of skilled workers said that they preferred to employ workers
of Vietnamese origin because they found them to be skilled,
hard working and patient. In contrast, local Cambodian workers
tended to be confined to less skilled work; for instance,
in construction, as labourers carrying sand, gravel and
cement.
Most representatives of local
authorities also admitted that in the villages surveyed
the sex trade is to some extent run and staffed by the Vietnamese.
In the survey villages, Vietnamese women work in brothels,
karaoke bars, massage parlours, dance halls and “coin-rubbing”
places. Those who work in dance halls operate independently
but others are obliged to receive customers under the strict
control of brothel-owners. The owners charge each customer
between 5,000 and 70,000 riels: the workers are paid only
a subsistence amount.
In short, Vietnamese migrants
are low/medium to unskilled category workers; they work
hard and they engage in any activity to earn a living. The
intentions of Vietnamese migrants, particularly those who
migrate to neighbouring countries, are at times to return,
and at other times, to stay out permanently. Those who invest
in a business outside of Viet Nam (for example, fishing,
or personal care business in Cambodia) are typically expected
to find roots in the host location.
REASONS
FOR MOVING, EARNINGS, WORKING CONDITIONS AND ILLEGALITY
Internal migrants in Cambodia
who had left their villages less than one year before the
census stated that their principal reason for moving was
the need to search for employment (29 per cent of the total),
while the second reason given was the need to follow their
families (25 per cent). Family reasons in many cases are
also related to employment, since spouses move with migrants
in search of work. There were few differences in the reasons
given by male and female migrants, with females slightly
more likely to move for family reasons and males slightly
more likely to move for education and marriage. Increasing
numbers are leaving villages because of rising population
as well as unequal land distribution.
The wage difference between
agricultural work and unskilled work in Phnom Penh can be
significant: workers in paddy fields earn about 4,000 riels
per day – around $1 – while the prevailing wage
rate for unskilled/semi-skilled workers in the city can
be 6,000- 10,000 riels (Pon and Acharya, 2001). Garment
factories, in which about 3 per cent of the Cambodian labour
force are employed, pay a minimum of $45 a month; with overtime
work, most such workers are able to net $60-75 monthly.
Most garment workers are migrants and they remit earnings
home (Sok and others, 2001). Additionally, in rural areas
work is not available for more than a few months, while
in the city, work availability has no apparent seasonality.
A larger number of days of work translates into higher incomes.
Even in the case of rural-to-rural migration, while the
wage rate may not vary much, the number of days of work
does. People move from single-crop regions to double-crop
ones to fish, engage in logging or even work on road-building
and other construction work. Of late, it has not been uncommon
for people to take up work under “food-for-work”
programmes, even if they have to travel short distances.
For Cambodian workers in Thailand,
the differential wage rate is the main attraction: wages
are much higher than what they are at home for similar work.
Table 3 shows the average earnings available locally compared
with the average received by migrants in Thailand (converted
in both cases to United States dollars for comparability).
This holds true for workers of both sexes.

Life for Cambodian migrants
in Thailand, though, is not easy. Since most are illegal
migrants, they face harassment and at times imprisonment
if they are caught, and being caught is not uncommon. At
times, bribes to cross the border or escape prosecution
and payments to intermediaries can cost the migrants their
entire earnings. Additionally, there are criminal gangs
who operate on both sides of the border, whose main job
is to rob and fleece the cross-border migrants.19 Yet, workers
choose to migrate, since otherwise they would face a food
shortage for 3-6 months in a year; they have no capital
to invest; they face unpredictable agricultural prices for
their crops; and they often have outstanding debts at monthly
interest rates of 10-30 per cent. Recent data from village
studies (for late 2001) show that up to 30 per cent of all
able-bodied workers in the border villages had moved to
Thailand for the short or medium term.
Respondents further stated
that migration could cause difficulties for those left behind.
For example, older parents are left behind with no help;
and there could be theft or land grabbing by others. Despite
these problems, many long-range migrants reported positive
outcomes from their experience: out of the 163 households
in the sample, 11 households bought land, 40 more opened
small businesses or bought motor-bicycles, and another 25
renovated or built houses. In addition, 57 per cent of households
with a longrange migrant member were able to meet short-term
food and farming requirements in 1999. Almost all short-range
migrants were able to save money. Also, migration was judged
to be good for the development of skills; the examples cited
were in construction work and tailoring. These in turn raised
the bargaining power of the migrants in the host markets
as well as their employability at home.
Researchers in Viet Nam widely
believe that migration helps to ease economic pressures.
People who are poorer are more prone to migrate than those
who are better off, although the poorest do not show the
highest rate of migration. This could be explained by the
fact that their economic resources to support workers to
move, such as transport fee and the like, are too low. Table
4, which is based on lifetime migration data, shows that
it is mainly the poor, particularly the rural poor, who
migrate. Interestingly, males migrate considerably more
than females in all expenditure classes, though there is
no gender-specificity across expenditure classes.
According to data obtained
from the Viet Nam Living Standards Survey (VLSS) of 1997/98,
however, the economic reason per se was not the most important
reason to migrate, either in the rural-to-urban stream or
otherwise. The main reasons were related to war, natural
disasters and family (table 5). Among urban migrants, only
22 per cent mentioned an economic reason, whereas 59 per
cent mentioned family-related reasons and 9.1 per cent,
others. Figures for rural migrants were 16.6 per cent, 46.3
per cent

and 37.1 per cent, respectively.
However, a more reasoned interpretation of the data suggests
that disasters are “push”-related factors. Disasters
often emerge from crop failures or other similar economic
setbacks. War-related factors are a priori inexplicable,
however, since the war ended a quarter of a century previously.
The VLSS 1997/98 data show
that the largest movement of people takes places for marital
reasons for both men and women. However, the ratio of women’s
migration for marital reasons is twice as high as that of
men’s migration. For economic reasons, both men and
women migrate in equal proportions.
In contrast to the VLSS data,
CDRI interviews fielded in April 2000 with 141 workers of
Vietnamese origin living in Cambodia revealed that motives
for migration were overwhelmingly economic. Better opportunities
to earn money in Cambodia were cited by almost all of them.
The lack of skilled workers in Cambodia has provided opportunities
for immigrant Vietnamese to work as construction foremen,
wood
processors, machine repairers etc. Weak immigration controls
in Cambodia also contribute to the flow. Since the mid-1990s,
the unofficial fee to cross the border is reported to have
been between $30 and $50, after which no work permit is
needed. A few of those interviewed had acquired a Cambodian
identity card, the unofficial fee for which is reportedly
between $50 and $100. Migrants are reportedly subject to
informal levies by police – ranging from 1,000 riels
to 20,000 riels per month (around $0.25-4.00) in the villages
surveyed.


per day, that is, more than
the $2 marking the World Bank’s mild poverty line
(table 6).21 Key informants reported much higher earnings
from medium- and large-scale fishing enterprises, which
are dominated by Vietnamese migrants. Vietnamese fishing
contractors compete for fishing concessions and often succeed
in getting them because of their prowess in technology and
business. On the downside, unofficial checkpoints levying
fees at rates between 500 riels and 2,000 riels have proliferated.
As a result, fishermen are encouraged to use illegal fishing
methods to meet these excessive demands, much to the detriment
of the fish stock. Respondents reported that the catch in
the survey areas fell by about 40 per cent in the late 1990s
compared with the 1980s.
Evidence in this section adequately
reveals that people move for long and short periods to seek
work and higher earnings in addition to obtaining more secure
jobs. Even those who state migration reasons other than
economic stand to gain economically. Earnings in the host
locations, whether for internal or international migration,
are well beyond the poverty lines stated above.
POVERTY
AND MIGRATION IN THE TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES – AN ASSESSMENT
Each of the three countries
from which data on migration have been analysed here has
experienced national and international out-migration of
its people, as well as inmigration of outsiders. In Cambodia,
cross-border migration, particularly of Cambodians to Thailand
and of Vietnamese to Cambodia, has attracted attention.
While the former move westward for unskilled work, the latter
move also westward from their origin to fill gaps in the
middle-level skilled-job segments in the market. The situation
in the Lao
People’s Democratic Republic is also somewhat similar:
a number of Lao workers cross the border to Thailand to
take up low-skilled jobs; meanwhile, the Lao People’s
Democratic Republic gets some skilled workers, who to a
great extent are from its neighbouring countries (China,
Thailand, Viet Nam). Lastly, Vietnamese workers have been
seeking jobs in as many as 30 countries around the world,
including its neighbouring countries; and being more skilled
than others, they effectively bridge gaps in the labour
markets in different locales. Often, migrants who move to
undertake seasonal work return soon, only to go back in
the following season. In contrast, relatively more skilled
workers and those who develop stakes (for example, acquire
assets or contracts) in the host countries, tend to stay
for long periods; in many cases their intention is to settle
down. Thus, the composition of the migrant flows and the
motives for migration differ significantly across groups.
All the evidence shows that
in the transitional economies there are increased cases
of relatively poorer rural workers seeking jobs anywhere
they can find them. They may not be the poorest, since the
poorest may not have the resources to manage and sustain
migration, but surely they belong to the weaker and more
deprived sections of the society. This is true of both internal
and international migrants; most workers do not differentiate
between whether they move within the country or cross borders.
To what extent have such movements affected poverty situations?
Evidence suggest that in most cases there is a wage difference
between the home location and the host location; in some
other cases, jobs are available, or available for longer
periods, and in yet other cases, there is a learning process
which in turn makes people more employable in higher paying
jobs.
Rough computations show that
almost all migrants earn more than subsistence wages. To
this extent, migration is a powerful tool to combat poverty.
In terms of indirect effects, data show that, in all cases,
whether the move is within the country or out of it, people
remit money.22 Remittances help in stabilizing the household
food security situation back home and help in enabling some
degree of capital formation. In a few instances, there is
a path formed for future migrants to enter the job market
from the outside. Next, expenditures of remittance monies
may help to create local jobs for those poor who may not
have succeeded in migrating. Indirect effects extend also
to filling gaps in certain segments in the labour markets,
which in turn, it is believed, improve the host economy
and hence create more jobs. Of course, there are negative
implications as well, both for the migrant workers and for
the host economies.
Migrants are forced to pay
bribes, face deprivation, get cheated etc., while in the
host countries there may be job losses for some local workers.
Nevertheless, migrants, at least on their part, consider
the negative effects to be more than offset by the positive
ones mentioned above.
Neither Cambodia nor the Lao
People’s Democratic Republic have an official policy
to promote or control migration. The only visible policy
in Cambodia appears to be of discouraging rural-to-urban
migration and providing land to the landless in rural areas
so that they can earn a living locally. Viet Nam, on the
other hand, has a clear policy on international migration.
Prior to 1999, other than the cross-border migration to
neighbouring countries on which there is no control, only
State enterprises could officially send workers out of the
country. Thereafter, private sector companies too have been
permitted to do so. There are stipulations, however, regarding
the size of the labour exporting company, the purpose of
export and the destination, in order to protect the interests
of the workers. Following leads from countries that have
had a wider exposure to and experience in migration (Bangladesh,
Sri Lanka, Thailand, for example), the latest thinking in
Viet Nam is to actively promote the export of skilled labour
to destinations where there is a demand for such workers.
However, no official stand on internal migration or cross-border
migration is currently available.
The descriptions in this paper
further suggest that while workers move with the same motive
– to maximize their income and standard of living
– there is vast heterogeneity in their composition,
employment conditions and social security. Human capital,
social networks and the identification of niches in labour
markets play a critical role in ensuring a better bargaining
position for the migrants.
CONCLUSION
This paper compiles contemporary
data on internal, cross-border and other forms of migration
that reflect upon the “push factors” in migration
(that is, the compulsion for people to migrate out of one’s
country or area to escape poverty) on the one hand, and
the filling up of extant gaps in the labour markets by migrant
labour, on the other. Most unskilled workers move out in
search of any job that may either gain for them higher wages
or a longer period of work, or both. Their span and destination
of migration depends upon their initial resource position.
The more skilled and enterprising workers
find niche segments in the markets, thereby creating a demand
for their services. Their earnings are generally higher.
Such migrants also move with the intention of being out
of their home locations for long periods of time, and at
times, permanently. In this sense, migrants are a heterogeneous
group.
All migrants face discrimination.
It could be in the form of having to pay bribes to be able
to remain in another location unlawfully, or for illegal
transportation. They also face exploitation by being paid
less for want of adequate bargaining power. Many also face
social sanctions. However, these are not characteristics
that have emerged today; they have existed for much longer,
perhaps for more than even a century, and have not deterred
migrants from migrating.
Migration has contributed to
the alleviation of poverty. This is evident from the fact
that more people are becoming mobile over time, they are
willing to travel longer distances, and they are also willing
to take more risks. However, the extent of poverty reduction
cannot be gauged from the existing data except through making
judgements based on wage or earnings differentials between
the home and host locations.
There can be no realistic policy
on internal migration in peasant economies with rapidly
growing populations. Instead, it would be more realistic
to put in place policies that could promote regionally balanced
development, encourage labour-intensive industries and activities,
and promote rapid human capital formation. International
migration also would be effectively influenced by such policies,
since labour movement under such policy regimes could be
expected to be mainly demand driven, and not of the distress
type in which workers get exploited and labour in host countries
face avoidable
competition.
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